نگاهی به رویدادهای منطقه و میهنمان

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غرض از این نوشته ارائه تصویری کلی از اوضاع عراق، سوریه، ترکیه و یمن بود که متأسفانه بعللی فرصت انجام این مقصود  نیست ولی در چند خط خلاصه را مینویسم:

W460

عراق، رمادی، داعش و شبه نظامیان شیعه

طبق اصول جنگ نا متعارف که جنگ نامنظم پارتیزانی نوعی از آنست یک نیروی شورشی غافلگیرانه به شهر، ده یا منطقه ایی  حمله  و آنرا تصرف میکند و بمجرد ظهور نیروهای منظم دولتی یا ارتش،  منطقه را تقریباً بدون مقاومت ترک میکند. هدف از این نوع جنگ نامتعارف( جنگ و گریز) خسته  و پخش کردن نیروی طرف مقابل  حاکم است و نه تصرف و حفظ یک منطقه. این مُتد جنگ پارتیزانی (خلقی یا نامتعارف )، در جریان جنگ داخلی چین علیه کومینگ تانک  را مائو تسه تونگ تئوریزه کرده و بکار بست و در جنگهای هندو چین  نیز همین تاکتیک بکار گرفته شد.

چندی پیش دولت عراق و شبه نظامیان شیعه عراق پس از کِش و قوسهای فراوان از جمله ، روی اینکه شبه نظامیان یا ارتش عراق فرماندهی را داشته باشند؟ یا اینکه پشتیبانی هوائی نیروهای ائتلاف، باشد یا نباشد؟ سرانجام شهر تکریت که تصور میشد وجب به وجب آن مین گزارش شده است بدون کمترین مقاومتی از سوی داعش تصرف شد و امتیاز آن در رسانه های منطقه و ایران عمدتاً بحساب شبه نظامبان شیعه  عراق گذارده شد. ولی واقعیت این بود که داعش به تبعیت از آن اصل پیش گفته، ازتکریت به آرامی عقب نشست و بجای سرشاخ شدن با ارتش منظم عراق و شبه نظامیان شیعه نیروهایش را متوجه مناطقی دیگر، در استان الانبار و صلاح الدین کرد که عمده ترین آن همین شهر رمادی است. باید اینجا اضافه کنم که برحسب درک من از تاکتیها و استراتژی داعش، نقطه قوت این جرایان در قابلیت تعرضی آنست و نه در توانمندی دفاعیش. داعش در تاکتیک تعرض، غافالگیری و هراس آفرینی بسیار ورزیده ولی در دفاع از آنچه تصرف میکند ضعیف است چه بلحاظ نظامی و چه بلحاظ اجتماعی و سیاسی.

حالا شبه نظامیبان شیعه ی شیر شده از تصرف آسان تکریت برآنند تا رکورد جدیدی در رمادی بجا  گذارند. ولی چندان معلوم نیست نبرد رمادی ازهمان الگوی پیش گفته تبعیت کند. رمادی میتواند در عین حال یک تله واقعی برای روی میدان مین کشاندن شبه نظامیان شیعه عراقی نیز باشد و نه تنها مین انفجاری بلکه مین اجتماعی و سیاسی.

ظاهراً؛ روند حوادث در اطراف نبرد رمادی چنان است که گویی همه پس کشیده و میدان را برای شبه نظامیان شیعه باز گذارده اند و شبه نظامیان شیعه هم در هپروت یک شاهکار آفرینی مستانه، به این شهر هجوم آورده تا آنرا از چنگ داعش آزاد کنند؟ پیش مستی و حتی بد مستی ناشی از پیروزی در این شهر بر داعش مفروض گرفته شده و ضرب شصت نشان دادن به همگان چنان شبه نظامیان شیعه عراقی و در صدر آن سپاه بدر را از خود بی خود ساخته است که این جریان مست، به این مسئله نیاندیشیده است که برای تصرف یک شهر سنُی مذهب که  در تصرف داعش بنیادگراست نمیتواند و بصلاح نیست که نام رمز ” لبیک یا حسین ” را برگزید. انتخاب این نامِ رمز برای چنان عملیاتی تا آن اندازه غیر عقلانی بوده است که صدای مقتدا صدر*را هم درآورد که او پیشنهاد تغیر ان نام رمز این عملیات  را به ” لبیک رمادی ” یا لبیک یا صلاح الدین”  داد است. ولی بنظر من کار از کار گذشته است و اگر این شبه نظامیان بتوانند بدون مقاومت جدی هم وارد رمادی شوند با مقاومت مدنی مردمی روبرو خواهند شد که این نام رمز را دهن کجی آشکار به مذهب و مقدسات و هویت دینی و فرهنگ مذهبی خود میدانند. البته قبل از مقتدا صدر مقامات نظامی آمریکا** هم به گزینش این نام رمز بخاطر معنای و پیام فرقانه گرانه اش ایراد گرفته بودند.

اشتباه است تصور شود که برگزیدن نامِ رمز عملیات رمادی اقدامی سهوی است.  گزینش این نام رمز از عمق گرایش فرقه گرایانه، استیلاجو و انحصارطلبانه  آن روحانیت بقدرت رسیده  در ایران است با انقلاب اسلامی از باطن به ظاهر تعین یافته و امری ذاتی است و نه به رمادی ختم میشود و نه  در یمن و بحرین پایان خواهد یافت. رژیم ایران با دمیدن در فتنه فرقه گرایی شیعی، در حقیقت برای داعش کارت دعوت وارد شدن به میهنمان را میفرستند. چه خود بداند و چه نداند فرجام  این کار و حرکات فرقه گرای شیعی، شکل گیری سنی گرایی فرقه ایی، در عکس العمل به ظهور و قدرت گیری فرقه گرایی شیعی است. دیر نیست آنروزی که  هزاران و ده ها هزاران ازمیلیونها جوان جان به لب رسیده در میهنمان چه سنی و چه شیعه  بجای لبیک یا حسین؛ لبیک یا داعش بگویند! رژیم ایران دیو فرقه گرایی شیعی را از کوزه جادوگری خود آزاد کرده است و مهار کردن آن در تمام منطقه حد اقل به گذشت چند ده سال  و رفت و امد چند نسل نیاز دارد.

BBC

توجه و توضیح:

ترکیه

غرض از این نوشته ارائه تصویری کلی از اوضاع عراق، سوریه، ترکیه و یمن بود که متأسفانه بعللی فرصت انجام این مقصود  نیست ولی در چند خط خلاصه را مینویسم:

۱  ـ اوضاع ترکیه با انتخابات پارلمانی ۷ ژوئن( یک هفته دیگر) وارد یک مرحله بحرانی خواهد شد که بآسانی پایان یافتنی نیست زیرا فضای سیاسی جاری مملکت حکایت از کشاندن آنتاگونیسمهای  ایدئولوژکی به عرصه سیاست عملی دارد و این یعنی تقسیم و گسستگی  ریشه ایی وفاق ملی در ترکیه که با اتاتورکیسم شکل گرفت و به ترکیه هویتی ملی بجای هویتی مذهبی داد .  این فرایندهمانند پدیده ایی است که با سیاسی شدن مذهب در همه منطقه بچشم میخورد و نمونه بارز ان لبنان است.

سوریه:

وحید معلم وزیر خارجه سوریه در یک مصاحبه گفت روسیه و ایران ما را تنها نخواهند گذارد و تا اخر با ما خواهند ایستاد و ما به این امر اطمینان داریم. و هیچ حرفبی درست تر و مقرون بواقعیت تر از این نمیتوان یافت و از زبان وزیر خارجه سوریه شنید. ولی تا اخر ایستادن ایران و روسیه در کنار سوریه یعنی پیوند خوردگی سرنوشتی  سوریه با روسیه و ایران. و این کاملاً درست است . با سقوط سوریه تمام محور ایران، سوریه و روسیه حزب الله و.. ،  از هم خواهد پاشید؛ بشمول نظامهای سیاسی آنان و محتملاً سازه و بافتار اجتماعیشان.

یمن:

اوضاع یمن بزیان حوثیها پیش میرود  زیرا که منفذ های کمک گیری اشان بتدریج مسدود میگردد و از سوی دیگر با مخالفینی روبرو میشوند که در کوره پیکار مسنجم تر و مصمم تر میگردند. باتلاق یمن برای ایران به باتلاق مرگ تبدیل میگردد.

لبنان:

اردوگاه مخالف حزبالله بتدریج مصممتر و محکمتر میشود و ارتش ان کشور بیش از پیش در موضعی قرار میگیرد که حاضر نیست رقیبی مانند حزبالله مسلح را بعنوان یک نیروی مسلح موازی در مملکت تحمل کند.

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Iraq Cleric Sadr Criticizes Operation Codename Choice

W460

by Naharnet Newsdesk ۳ hours ago

Influential Shiite cleric Moqtada Sadr on Wednesday criticized the codename given to a military operation in Sunni areas of Iraq, warning that it risked fanning the flames of sectarianism.

The Hashed al-Shaabi, an umbrella for mostly Shiite militias and volunteers, on Tuesday launched an operation aimed at severing the Islamic State jihadist group’s supply lines in Anbar province.

They named the offensive, in which regular government forces are also taking part, “Operation Labaik ya Hussein”, which roughly translates as “We are at your service, Hussein” and refers to one of Shiite Islam’s most revered imams.

“This name is going to be misunderstood, there’s no doubt,” said Sadr in a statement presented as an answer to a question by a religious student.

“Hussein is a national symbol and a prince of jihad… but we don’t want him to be used by the other side to claim this is a sectarian war,” he said.

Sadr, whose own paramilitary organization Saraya al-Salam is involved in operations against IS, said names such as “Labaik ya Salaheddin” or “Labaik ya Anbar” would have been more appropriate.

Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi had been reluctant to send the Hashed al-Shaabi to Anbar but was left with little choice because of the poor performance of Iraq’s regular forces when IS took Anbar’s provincial capital of Ramadi on May 17.

With U.S. backing, he had favored training up local tribal forces to be incorporated in the Hashed, a solution seen as more palatable to the province’s overwhelmingly Sunni population.

The Pentagon also expressed its disappointment at the operation’s codename, describing it as “unhelpful”.

Abadi, who faces criticism from his own camp for reaching out to Iraq’s Sunni minority, has yet to comment on the controversy.

**

BBC

Pro-government forces in Iraq have formally launched an operation to drive Islamic State out of Anbar province.

The announcement was made by a spokesman for the Popular Mobilisation (al-Hashid al-Shaabi), a force comprising dozens of Shia militias.

He said the operation would see government troops and militiamen move southwards from Salahuddin province and seek to cut off IS militants in Ramadi.

The provincial capital fell to IS this month after Iraq’s army withdrew.

Since then government forces have been massing for a counter-attack in the western province, and they say they have regained some ground east of Ramadi in the past few days.

On Tuesday, fighting was reported south and west of Ramadi, as the Iraqi forces tried to cut off supply routes to the city.

The offensive has been welcomed by the Americans, with Vice-President Joe Biden pledging full US support, the BBC’s defence correspondent Jonathan Marcus says.

But he adds that Washington remains uneasy about the prominent role of Shia fighters, many of whom are backed by Iran.

Separately, French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius criticised the Iraqi government, saying Paris had joined a US-led coalition last year in carrying out air strikes against IS on the basis that Baghdad represented the interests of all groups in the country.

“There is no military solution without a political solution. In September, we linked the coalition’s support to political commitments by the new Iraqi government, what we call an inclusive policy,” Mr Fabius was quoted as saying by Reuters.

“This contract is what justified our military engagement and I say clearly here that it must be better respected,” he added.

‘New weapons’

The Popular Mobilisation’s spokesman, Ahmed al-Assadi, told a televised news conference that the operation to regain control of Anbar would

.be called “Labayk ya Hussein” (“At your service, O Hussein”) – a reference to a revered Shia imam.

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W460

by Naharnet Newsdesk ۲۴ minutes ago

Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem said Wednesday that Iran and Russia would never give up their support for his regime in the face of a four-year-old armed revolt.

“I assure you that the relationship between Syria, the Russian Federation, and the Islamic Republic of Iran is much deeper than some people think,” Muallem said at a press conference with his visiting Armenian counterpart Edward Nalbandian.

He said Tehran and Moscow “have not and will not delay in providing aid to help us persevere,” while armed rebels had “clear support from conspirators” and were infiltrating from Turkey.

In March, embattled President Bashar Assad said Russia and Iran “want stability and a political solution for Syria”.

The three countries share “the same view” of Syria’s four-year conflict, he said.

Muallem said Damascus looked forward to “a better and bigger Iranian role in the international arena” after the end of Tehran’s negotiations with world powers on a nuclear accord.

In early April, Syria welcomed a framework deal struck by Tehran and world powers on Iran’s nuclear program, saying it would help ease regional and international tensions.

Iran is one of Syria’s largest backers, sending financial and military support — including military advisors — to prop up the Assad regime.

Syria’s conflict began in March 2011 with anti-government demonstrations, but evolved into a protracted and bloody civil war that has left at least 220,000 people dead.

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Nusra Front Chief Vows to Defeat Hizbullah

W460

by Naharnet Newsdesk ۲ hours ago

Al-Qaida-affiliate al-Nusra Front chief vowed in a wide-randing televised interview late Wednesday to defeat Hizbullah in al-Qalamoun.

Without showing his face, Abu Mohamed al-Jolani promised defeat for Hizbullah, which has significantly bolstered the Bashar Assad regime, in the mountainous border region between Syria and Lebanon.

“Hizbullah knew the ugliness of the Syrian regime. It knew its fate was directly linked to Bashar’s fate,” Jolani warned.

“Qalamoun will be an important gateway for Damascus when the battle for the capital begins,” he added.

“As soon as Bashar is defeated, it will be the end for Hizbullah.”

Much like his interview in 2013, the Nusra chief said the end of the Assad regime was near.

“I assure you, the fall of Bashar is not far away,” he said. “I do not want to project much optimism, but there are very positive signs.”

He rejected a political end to the conflict, saying that any political agreement “reached in the halls of Washington… would cost the blood of the Syrian people.”

Jolani also firmly denied receiving any state funding, saying that Nusra was financed by its own “businesses activities” and contributions from individual donors.

He stressed that the group would not use Syria as a launching pad for attacks on the West.

Jolani said his group, Al-Nusra Front, would protect Syrian minorities that renounced the regime.

The interview was Jolani’s second with Qatari-owned Al-Jazeera TV since a similar appearance in 2013. The interviewer, Ahmad Mansur, said it was broadcast “from liberated lands in Syria.”

All that could be seen of Jolani was a black shawl, a plaid shirt, and gesturing hands.

“The instructions that we have are not to use al-Sham as a base to launch attacks on the West or Europe, so as not to muddy the current war,” Jolani said.

“Our mission in Syria is the downfall of the regime, its symbols, and its allies, like Hizbullah,” Jolani said, referring to the powerful Shiite movement fighting alongside the Bashar Assad regime.

But if the United States kept attacking them, he said, “all options are open. Anyone has the right to self-defense.”

Jolani also denied the existence of the “Khorasan group,” which the U.S. had said was an offshoot of al-Qaida that was plotting attacks against the U.S..

Nevertheless, he lambasted the U.S. for its air raids against Al-Nusra in Syria and accused it of coordinating with the Assad regime on the use of air space.

“America is propping up the regime,” Jolani charged, leaning forward in an ornate golden-crusted chair.

– ‘We will protect them’ –

Al-Nusra and its extremist rival the Islamic State group have been designated as terrorist organisations by the U.S. since the end of 2012.

Since September, a U.S.-led international coalition has been raiding jihadist positions in Syria, although most strikes have targeted IS.

In recent months, Al-Nusra has led a rebel coalition in a series of key victories in Syria’s northwest Idlib, including the provincial capital and a large military base.

The gains have opened the road for a potential jihadist advance on Latakia and Tartus, coastal provinces that are home to Syrian minorities including Christians and Alawites, the offshoot of Shiite Islam to which the Assad clan belongs.

Extremist groups in Syria, including Al-Nusra and IS, have been accused of targeting these minority communities.

But Al-Nusra’s chief seemed to try to play down those fears, saying his group “only fights those who fight us.”

“If the Alawites leave their religion and leave Bashar al-Assad, we will protect them,” Jolani said.

He said Christians living under the rule of Al-Nusra were living in peace, and that in a future state ruled by Islamic law, the financially capable would pay “jizya,” or tax reserved for non-Muslims.

Wednesday’s interview was the first in a two-part series, to be continued next week.

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The West’s election forecast: Weak AKP, weak Erdoğan

SERKAN DEMİRTAŞ

serkan.demirtas@hurriyet.com.tr

countries as well as Turkey’s Western allies, including the United States and the European Union.

Turkey, located right in the middle of two great fault lines created by crisis-riddenUkraine in the north and Syria in the south, is going to continue to play an important role in both theaters. It will continue to be the country whose door its Western allies go to in line with regional developments. That’s why a stable government respecting fundamental freedoms and democratic norms, as well as conducting a sound foreign policy, is very important in their eyes.

My conversations with diplomats based in Ankara about the upcoming polls and their estimations give important clues on Western countries’ projections for the post-election era. Here are some of the most important points I have observed:

Justice and Development Party (AKP) still the winner: There is no doubt that the AKP is going to be the top party in the elections. However, it is widely estimated that the party’s vote share will drop below the 46 percent it won in last year’s municipal elections. According to many diplomats’ estimations, the AKP’s vote share will be between 40 and 42 percent.

Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) over the threshold: The general expectation of diplomats is that the pro-Kurdish HDP will be able to pass the 10 percent threshold. Some even think the party could garner up to 11 percent of votes, which means it would be represented by 60 deputies in the next government.

Presidential system nixed: In the event that these two expectations turn out to be true, the number of seats the AKP will have will be between 276 and 300. This would mean that it could still form a government, but it would fall short of launching an initiative on its own for the adoption of a presidential system.

Coalition scenarios: Diplomats are also analyzing the possibility that the AKP’s loss of votes may even be higher than expected and the parliamentary composition would necessitate the formation of a coalition government. Given the current political climate, it would be difficult for the AKP to find a coalition partner, as none of the opposition parties want to be seen as a supporter of the ruling party. In such a case, a minority government to be formed by the AKP and backed informally by one of the opposition parties is seen as a bigger possibility.

Early polls: If the result ends up producing a coalition or a minority government, early elections are inevitable, according to diplomats, expressing concerns that this set of circumstances could lead to fresh political tension and instability in the country.

Erdoğan’s influence: President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan will feel less comfortable with an AKP government that has lost power and an important number of parliamentary seats. This is why Erdoğan himself has joined the election campaign.

Erdoğan’s mistake: Diplomatic sources believe that one of the reasons why the AKP is losing votes – along with increasing government fatigue – is Erdoğan’s strategy to turn parliamentary elections into a referendum in which the presidential system, and therefore his career, will be voted on. Recalling that a majority of the Turkish people remains against changing to a presidential system, and that Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu is very reluctant to talk about the issue, sources describe this as Erdoğan’s mistake.

In-house debates: Such a picture would lead an already existing disaccord between Erdoğan and Davutoğlu to another dimension, which would also bring about in-house challenges in the AKP with no prospective results.

Peace process, democratization: One issue of concern for foreign diplomats is the idea that the democratic instability in the country due to the AKP’s policies could also create institutional and political instability. In that case, many think that radical but necessary steps with regard to the Kurdish peace process, democratization and other fundamental issues, as well as recalibrating Turkey’s foreign policy, are unlikely to be taken.

What Gül will do?: Although former President Abdullah Gül, one of founders of the AKP, recently denied all claims that he will return to active politics and form a new political party, diplomats in Ankara are still questioning the possibility of his return, as the post-election political situation might prompt off new searches. Given their estimations that the post-election era may lead to early polls, it should not be seen surprising that they are still eyeing Gül’s next step.

Election safety: Along with all of these items, election safety is also an issue that foreign diplomats are dealing with. An Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe(OSCE) team has already paid visits to political parties and conducted meetings in Turkey in order to have a better and a clearer picture. Three top shortcomings that the team has observed so far are President Erdoğan’s active (though unconstitutional) campaigning for the government, the media’s unfair coverage of political parties, and the ruling AKP benefiting from state means during the campaign.

May/27/2015

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What went wrong in Turkey?

Hurryat Dailly News

MUSTAFA AKYOL

akyol@mustafaakyol.org

About a decade ago, Turkey was widely seen as the shining star of the Muslim world – an increasingly liberal democracy and a booming economy led by a cadre of reformist Islamists united under the Justice and Development Party (AKP). Today, the same party is still in power, but there is little left shining about Turkey. What we have instead is an increasingly illiberal (i.e. authoritarian) democracy that is regressing in almost every liberal criteria, and which is disillusioning everyone except the AKP’s hardcore supporters.

Here is a brief story of what went wrong. The “Islamo-liberal synthesis” that the AKP seemed to embrace in its initial years (2002-2010) was caused by some genuine soul-searching, but also a burning necessity: Turkey was still under the thumb of hardcore secularist generals who could overthrow the AKP. The safest life tube out from this danger was the “Copenhagen Criteria” of the European Union, which the AKP clung onto.

Some significant names in the party, such as Abdullah Gül, had genuinely internalized liberal democracy. But the most significant name, current President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, apparently saw it just as an instrument. Once Erdoğan subdued the military in 2010 and further consolidated power with a great election victory in 2011, he trashed out what he now saw as little more than “Copenhagen blah blah.” He redefined democracy as amounting to nothing but elections, granting full hegemony to the winner of the elections.

The next two years saw an ever more assertive AKP, returning to the Islamist narrative that it had supposedly abandoned, and poking the fears of secular Turks. The latter’s reaction triggered the Gezi Park protests of June 2013, which initiated the third era of the AKP: Paranoid authoritarianism. Erdoğan interpreted Gezi not as a spontaneous social phenomenon, which it was, but as a heinous conspiracy concocted by nefarious global powers. Rather than seeking understanding and reconciliation, he opted for flexing his muscles and demonizing the opposition.

Things got worse with the intra-state political war between the AKP and the movement of U.S.-based Islamic scholar Fethullah Gülen, which broke out with the corruption investigations of December 2013. Instead of seeing this as a power struggle with a group that he himself had empowered, Erdoğan interpreted it as yet another heinous conspiracy by nefarious global powers. The result was not only a witch-hunt against the Gülen movement, but also an even more paranoid outlook that sees a plot behind every stone – and every critical comment.

Meanwhile, all critical voices and independent minds in the AKP have been muted, as the party has been taken over by Erdoğan’s cult of personality. Both Gül – and the “Gül line” – have been carefully purged, and sycophants have been promoted.

This is a very sad story, especially for people like me who had much higher hopes and expectations. What is most tragic is that it did not have to be this way. Had the AKP just been a little more modest, a little less ambitious, and little less hungry for revenge, it could have accomplished a historic reconciliation with the social groups that it is busy demonizing these days.

Future generations should take lessons from this story. The big moral problems are arrogance, self-righteousness, machismo, nepotism and corruption. Conspiratorial thinking also plays a big role, pointing to a burning intellectual poverty. At the end of the day, it turns out that our political culture is not yet mature enough to achieve liberal democracy. We will begin to mature only when we look at the mirror and dare to see who we really are.

May/27/2015

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